


# UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PEACEBUILDING FUND



## Partner Visit to Chad

20 – 25 October 2024 | Delegation folder



<https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/Chad-visit-documents-Oct-2024>

## **Welcome to Chad**

The United Nations in Chad is pleased to welcome a high-level partners' visit led by Assistant Secretary-General Elizabeth Spehar of the Peacebuilding Support Office from October 21 to 25, in N'Djamena, Chad.

This visit will focus on the UN Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) investments in Chad, both at the national level and specifically in the East and Lac provinces. The delegation will have the opportunity to:

- (i) Gain firsthand insights and perspectives on Chad's conflict and peacebuilding context;
- (ii) Witness the results of PBF initiatives funded between 2017 and 2024, with particular attention to ongoing initiatives; and
- (iii) Understand the need for continued support and how partners and UN Country Team intend to catalyze PBF's support to increase peacebuilding impact and investments in Chad.

The visit comes at a critical time for Chad. The country recently concluded a fragile political transition with the Presidential election in May 2024, and is now preparing for legislative and local elections planned for December 2024. At the same time, Chad faces a refugee crisis in the East, ongoing violent extremist activity in the Lake Chad region, rising humanitarian needs, and the impact of natural disasters, including flooding across various provinces.

Additionally, this visit marks a crucial point in Chad's partnership with the Peacebuilding Support Office. The country's five-year eligibility for the PBF's Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility ended in December 2023, following an exceptional one-year extension to align with Chad's extended transition calendar. In 2023, Chad was the largest recipient of PBF allocations globally, reflecting strong efforts to support a peaceful and inclusive transition.

In 2024, a Portfolio Evaluation was completed, alongside an updated Conflict Analysis. Chad's authorities have expressed interest in seeking a renewed five-year eligibility for the PBF Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility, with the request expected by the end of the year. This visit will provide an opportunity for the delegation to understand potential entry points and opportunities for this request, particularly in relation to the implementation of the Doha Peace Agreement and the Recommendations of the Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue.

At the same time, Chad is exploring the feasibility of renewing its eligibility to the World Bank Prevention and Resilience Allocation. This offers opportunities for alignment and synergies with the PBF's contributions, especially regarding key milestones such as the operationalization of an infrastructure for peace, the roll-out of a national peacebuilding strategy, and addressing conflicts around natural resource management.

## **Chad: A Snapshot**

With a surface area of 1,284,000 km<sup>2</sup>, making it the fifth largest country in Africa, the Republic of Chad is a landlocked country in Central Africa, bordering Libya to the north, Sudan to the east, the Central African Republic to the south and Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger to the west.

According to INSEED demographic projections based on the 2009 general population census, Chad's population is estimated to be 18,033,737 in 2023, with a demographic growth rate of 3.6%, one of the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. Of this population, 51% are women, 67% are under the age of 25, and 55% are under the age of 15. Life expectancy at birth has improved from 52.4 years (51.6 years for men and 53.4 years for women) to 54 years (53.7 years for men and 54.4 years for women) between 2009 and 2022. According to MICS 2019, total fertility in Chad is estimated at 6.4 children per woman.

The Republic of Chad is a secular state, founded on the principles of democracy by direct universal suffrage. The 2018 institutional reform established the Fourth Republic and changed the country's administrative organisation, opting for a decentralised unitary state with 23 provinces, 115 departments and 420 communes.

Since late July 2024, Chad has been affected by floods. Government data from 13 September states that 1,688,439 people have been affected with 487 fatalities. The most severely hit provinces are Lac, Tandjilé, Mayo Kebbi Est, Mandoul, and Batha. The capital N'Djaména counts 61,367 people affected

## **Political Context**

Chad has been undergoing a political transition since the death of President Deby Itno in April 2021. Opposition parties and civil society organizations have been calling for the rapid return to constitutional order and civilian rule.

### ***Unachieved peace despite political settlements and peace accords***

The Doha Peace Agreement was signed in August 2022 between the transitional government and most political-military groups to end the hostilities and create condition for reconciliation and sustainable peace. The agreement provides, among others, for a general ceasefire the establishment of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program, and an amnesty law for former rebels. The Doha peace agreement created the conditions for the Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue (DNIS) held from 20 August to 8 October 2022. The conclusions of the DNIS paved the way of the transition which is expected to be achieved in early 2025 after the legislative and local elections. Despite these accomplishments, national reconciliation and peace remain challenged.

The implementation of the Doha Peace Agreement remains challenged by issues of inclusion and insufficiency of financial resources. Several armed groups that are not signatories to the Doha Peace Agreement are interested in disarmament, while those who signed the agreement are frustrated by the slow progress in the implementation of the Doha peace agreement including DDR and other provisions.

The DDR policy that is being developed with the support of the UN (PBF funding) is expected to articulate the vision of the Government of Chad in a clear strategy for DDR. Meanwhile, the political and regional security context calls to pursue trust building around the process, in relation to both signatories and non-signatories of the agreement. DDR can also lay the ground for community

violence reduction initiatives in the cross-border areas. The reintegration component of the DDR programme thus remains a great opportunity to extend peace dividends to local communities while involving them in violence prevention efforts.

Reconciliation is also needed between Chadians from all over the country, as well as between the political elite. The implementation of the Doha Peace Agreement should be thus accompanied by a national strategy for social cohesion.

The DNIS resolutions opened the second phase of the transition for a period of 24 months, with the establishment of an inclusive government and the organization of the presidential elections. The key recommendations of the DNIS are as follows: i) A presidential term of office of five years, renewable once; ii) A bicameral parliament (National Assembly and Senate); iii) Eligibility of all Chadians to stand in the presidential elections, including the transitional authorities, in accordance with the law; iv) The extension of the initial transition period by 24 months; v) Dissolution of the Transitional Military Council and the appointment of General Mahamat Déby Itno as the president of the transition. However, this national consensus will be challenged by several events that impacted confidence among various components of the Chadian society, and in extenso the cohesion of the country.

The adopted constitution was promulgated on the 1st of January 2024 by the Transition President. It paved the way for the presidential and legislative elections and the reinstatement of civilian rule.

### ***Chadians elected their President***

On 6 May, the presidential election took place amidst relative calm. On 9 May, the preliminary results indicated that Mahamat Déby Itno had won the election, with competing claims by then Transition Prime Minister Succès Masra. “Celebratory” gunfire by security forces resulted in several people killed or injured. On 16 May, the Constitutional Council confirmed Mr. Mahamat Déby Itno’s victory with 61% of votes. The voter participation rate was reportedly 75.78%. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), which had deployed observers did not report massive irregularities that would have questioned the validity of the vote. The US and EU, while welcoming the holding of the election, regretted the non-accreditation of numerous observer missions and called on Chad to strengthen its institutional framework for future elections. The AU Commission refused to comment on the election, noting the AU Peace and Security Council’s call for Mr. Mahamat Déby Itno not to run. Other external partners including France and Russia congratulated Mr. Mahamat Déby Itno.

Despite some protests by the opposition actors, Chad confirmed its new President. On 23 May, Mr. Mahamat Déby Itno was sworn in as President. That same day, Allamaye Halina, a technocrat from the South, was appointed Prime Minister. On 27 May, a 35-member Government was appointed, comprising 25 ministers, two deputy ministers and eight state secretaries. Only 22% of cabinet posts went to women- well below the envisaged 30% threshold. Twenty-three ministers were retained from the previous cabinet. All the newly appointed ministers are from the platform of political parties and civil society organizations that supported Mahamat Déby’s presidential campaign.

The former rebel group UFR as well as the UNDR of former Prime Minister Kebzabo remain represented, while the “Les Transformateurs” opposition party of Mr. Masra has been removed. A

regional balance was maintained, with all provinces represented. There are strong indications that the political opposition hopes to obtain a strong representation in Parliament after the forthcoming legislative elections.

***Legislative and local elections will be held despite unsolved issues regarding the electoral management system***

The official calendar for the legislative, provincial, and municipal elections has been published three months after the Presidential election. These forthcoming elections are expected to mark the end of the political transition which started after the death of President Deby Itno in April 2021. On 21 August, the president of the Chadian electoral management body (ANGE), Mr. Ahmet Batchiret announced the official schedule for legislative, provincial, and municipal elections. The ANGE will receive candidacies from 17 to 28 October and will publish the provisional list of candidates on 4 November 2024. The final lists of candidates for the legislative elections will be published on 16 November by the Constitutional Council while those for the provincial and municipal elections are to be published by 24 November. The electoral campaign will take place from 7 to 27 December and elections are planned to be held on 29 December; provisional result should be proclaimed by the ANGE on 15 January 2025. The final results will be proclaimed by the Constitutional Council on 31 January for the legislative and provincial elections and 3 February for the municipal elections. The last legislative elections were held in 2011.

The announcement of the official schedule for the legislative, provincial, and municipal elections has been skeptically received by the main political opposition entities. The opposition actors, notably the leader of *Les Transformateurs*, Dr. Succes Masra, and the Groupe de Concertation des Acteurs Politiques (GCAP) and civil society organizations have indicated they found the decision precipitous, as they deem the electoral register outdated and unreliable. The opposition also contests the electoral districting.

Despite the *Politique de la main tendue* of the President, there are many challenges to achieving sustainable peace in Chad. On 8 August, marking the second anniversary of the Doha Peace Agreement, the President reiterated his commitment to achieving lasting peace in Chad. In his social media address, the President placed an emphasis on accelerating the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants envisaged in the peace agreement. The President called on politico-military groups which have not signed the peace agreement to join the national reconciliation process.

Meanwhile, some of the signatories to the Doha Peace Agreement of August 2022 have expressed frustration with the delays in the implementation of the agreement. The envisaged DDR process is only slowly gaining momentum, amidst a lack of sufficient financial resources.

Nonetheless, several hundred fighters affiliated with Chadian rebel groups based in Libya (both signatories and non-signatories of the peace agreement) have reportedly returned from Libya over recent months to join disarmament initiatives. Several Chadian armed groups, in Libya, Sudan and the Central African Republic, continue to pose latent threats, despite continued efforts by the Community of Sant'Egidio and Switzerland to promote a political agreement.



***Sustaining peace as both process and objective remains challenged by various factors both internal and external***

Sustaining peace in Chad remains also challenged by both community-level conflict and violence, and the ongoing war in Sudan. The armed violence in Darfur (Sudan) threatens peace and stability in Chad for various reasons. In response to escalating military operations in Darfur, Chad has intensified security measures along the Sudanese border by deploying military reinforcements. The reinforcement is intended to counter the infiltration of armed groups into Chadian territory and the potential entry of opposition groups from Sudan. Chadian authorities stated that these security measures are routine ones aimed at preventing hostile actions against the country.

In addition, community level conflicts are challenging social cohesion and stability. Violent conflicts with major casualties have been reported several times. In March 2024, an intercommunity conflict over land and water unfolded in the Tileguey Sub-prefecture of Magrane, department of Djourf-Al Ahmar in the Ouaddai province (East). The related violence resulted in the deaths of 42 persons while several others were injured. Ouaddai province has historically been a hotspot for disputes over land rights and intercommunal tensions. The province also hosts a significant number of returnees and refugees. On 23 August 2024, the International Crisis Group (ICG) published a report on the intensification of the intercommunal violence in Chad. According to the ICG, conflicts between farmers and herders have resulted in over 1,000 deaths and 2,000 injuries, have pitted northern communities against southern communities and have been made worse by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. ICG's analysis suggests that long-standing tensions between sedentary southern populations and northern pastoral communities are exacerbated by climate change and increased migration of northern cattle owners. According to ICG, the measures taken by the government should be improved to provide security and justice.

The situations at border areas also threaten sustainable peace and development. At sub-national levels, transborder insecurity fuels local conflicts that oftentimes result in community violence, and criminality that poses major risks for the protection of civilians and the safety of humanitarian actors including the personnel of NGOs and UN entities. Meanwhile, the resulting humanitarian situation delays local development initiatives. On the other hand, increasing cross-border insecurity affects national development action due to recurrent shifts in the Government's priorities. For instance, initial resources dedicated to the provision of basic social services in peripheral and cross-border areas or countrywide might be re-allocated to defense and security<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Chad is one of the ten countries in the world that devotes the largest share of its budget to military expenditure, which considerably limits its investment in basic social services (education, health and sanitation, etc.) and essential infrastructure (electricity and roads, etc.).

## **Socio-economic and humanitarian situation**

The persistent appeal by Chadian authorities for international support in their efforts to address both structural and emerging challenges is justified by the complexity of humanitarian, peace, and development issues. Chad is among the poorest country in Africa with various institutional and socio-economic development gaps that have been hampering the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. In addition to these internal challenges, Chad is also affected by climate insecurity while being surrounded by countries that experience protracted political instability and armed violence. According to the latest Human Development Report, Chad is ranked 189th out of 193 countries, with a Human Development Index of 0.394. In 2023, Chad ranked 9th among the most fragile countries and is considered an extremely fragile country according to the OECD's dimensions of fragility.

The male literacy rate (64%) is nearly twice that of female literacy (35%). In Chad, gender and human rights issues are a major challenge. Several laws have been passed to combat discrimination against women. These include Law No. 001/PR/2017 of 08 May 2017 criminalising a large number of forms of gender-based violence, and the law ratifying Ordinance No. 12/PR/2018 setting a 30% quota for women in all appointed positions, with the aim of gradually moving the quota towards parity.

The ongoing conflict in Sudan is having several socio-economic impacts on Chad including increased humanitarian and security spending, trade disruption, reduced investment, and reduced export revenues. The additional burden of the conflict in Sudan is putting additional strain on Chad's economy. The increase in oil prices raises concerns about social discontent and tensions. This risk is even more likely since automatic social stabilizers are ineffective with a very low social protection rate (1.6%). Popular frustration could thus weaken the government and threaten political stability if mitigation measures are not taken.

With only five years until 2030, Chad continues to grapple with pervasive poverty and vulnerability, with 44.8% of the population living below the national poverty line. Extreme poverty (\$2.15 /day per capita, PPP 2017) has notably increased from 31.2% in 2018 to 34.9% in 2021 and 35.4% in 2023 according to the World Bank. The World Bank also notes that the Chadian economy grew by 3% in 2023, driven mainly by the oil sector, despite moderate growth in the previous year due to flooding and insecurity. However, uncertainties weigh on the economic outlook, with growth projected at 3.7% in 2024, subject to risks such as falling oil prices, political instability in the run-up to elections, rising insecurity, climate shocks as well as the lingering effects of the Sudanese crisis. Inflation is forecasted to remain high, at 10.1% and 7% in 2024 and 2025 respectively, due to the closure of borders with Sudan for security reasons, and low agricultural production because of climate change.

The humanitarian situation in Chad is dire, with over one million refugees from Sudan, the Central African Republic, Nigeria, and Cameroon, exacerbating resource competition and escalating tensions. As of 28. May 2024 599,840 Sudanese refugees and 171,124 Chadian returnees from Sudan have been registered by UNHCR. The number of displaced persons has surged to an estimated 267,303, including 215,928 internally displaced persons and 51,375 returnees. Southern Chad bears a significant burden, hosting 123,698 refugees and 77,650 Chadian returnees who fled violence in the Central African Republic between 2014 and 2021. These vulnerable populations,

especially the poorest, face urgent needs, with malnutrition rates surpassing emergency thresholds, further heightening the risk of conflict.


### **Eastern Provinces**

In the eastern region, Chad shares a 1,400 km border with Sudan. The three provinces bordering Sudan are Wadi Fira, Sila and Ouaddaï. These three provinces have about ten ethnic groups, most of which straddle the two countries. Livestock, agriculture and trade remain the main economic activities in this area.


Disputes between two individuals of different ethnic groups can degenerate into a community conflict by taking sides/ranking ethnic group. In 2003, Chad welcomed thousands of Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees following the Darfur crisis. This crisis had repercussions in the provinces of Chad located at the border with attacks by people identified as either Sudanese or Chadian rebels. Several actions and measures were taken by the Chadian government to contain this situation. Twenty (20) years after this event, the conflict broke out in April 2023 between the paramilitary groups of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese armed forces while Sudan had already been going through an unprecedented humanitarian crisis for about ten years.

Host communities are severely affected by the crisis, with the additional pressure exacerbating their existing vulnerabilities. One year into the crisis, there are reports of tensions between host communities and refugees, while needs far outstrip the assistance provided. (map shows the distribution of Sudanese refugees in the sub-region – source UNHCR as of October 2024)





**Sudan Emergency: Population movements from Sudan (6 October, 2024)**



**Source: International Organization for Migration**

Abéché, in eastern Chad between the wadis Chao and Sao, is the fourth largest city in Chad and is the capital of Ouaddaï province. It has within it the remnants of the ancient capital, including palaces, mosques, and the tombs of former sultans. Abéché is surrounded by savanna-type terrain that is an important cattle-raising area, but the distance from suitable markets hinders development of the cattle industry. Abéché is linked by main road to the capital, N'Djamena (formerly Fort-Lamy), Sarh (formerly Fort-Archambault), and Sudan. The Lycée Franco-Arabe (a secondary school) is in the town, which has an airport and a hospital and supports some light industry, including the manufacture of camelhair blankets.

### **The Lake Chad Basin**


Lac province is one of the 23 regions of Chad. Its capital is Bol, and other major settlements include Bagassola, Daboua, Doum Doum, Kangalam, Kouloudia, Liwa, Ngouboua and Ngouri. The province is in the west of the country, bordering the Kanem province to the north and east, Hadjer-Lamis and Cameroon to the south, Nigeria to the southwest, and Niger to the northwest. The population of the province is 451,639 inhabitants. The main ethnolinguistic groups are the Kanembou (over 66%) and the Yedina (called Boudouma by the Kanembou) (over 18%), the Hausa, etc.

Since 2014, the Lac Chad Basin region has been affected by multiple incidents and threats, causing the displacement of millions of persons in the region including internal displaced people and refugees. The security situation continues to give cause for concern around Lake Chad, where non-state armed groups, including Boko Haram, are spreading insecurity. The inhabitants are caught in a trap of conflict exacerbated by climate change. The recurrent displacement of various population groups reduces the ability of communities to cope with seasonal shocks and prevents them from developing resilience in the face of the regular crises that affect these areas. Affected populations have moved away from their usual place of residence, to settle in areas that are oftentimes insecure, fearing for their lives and those of their families. This situation led to the deterioration of social cohesion and to the installation of mistrust among the different population groups.

In addition to the volatile security situation, the region is affected by the phenomenon of natural disasters (drought, floods etc) triggered by climate change, destroying the houses and agricultural farms of vulnerable populations already living in a difficult situation. The most affected populations are children, women, and elder persons with different vulnerabilities. The security situation and the disaster events have a negative impact on the livelihoods and the economy of the region, reducing the opportunities for host communities and displaced populations to have a better life.

## The Peacebuilding Fund in Chad

Chad was declared eligible for the **Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility** of the PBF in May 2017 for a period of five years, which was extended until 31 December 2023 in order to continue the United Nations system's support for the Chadian government's efforts during the period of political transition. The PBF has invested \$57.81 million in Chad to support 22 peace-building projects, including 5 cross-border projects: two projects on the issue of transhumance with Niger and CAR, an initiative to support local peace-building mechanisms in the cross-border region with Cameroon, a



regional project aimed at strengthening networks of young 'peace weavers' with Cameroon and Gabon, as well as promoting the participation of CSOs in the Lake Chad Basin region with Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria. These investments focused on the two main axes of the 2017 eligibility request, which are (i) restoring the rule of law, local governance and social cohesion, and (ii) strengthening the resilience of vulnerable communities. The table on the left shows the budget allocation per entity between 2017 and 2023.

Since 4 April 2023, a PBF **Joint Steering Committee** (JSC) has been in place, co-chaired by the minister in charge of planning and the UN Resident Coordinator. This high-level body is responsible for the strategic direction and coordination of peacebuilding projects, and for ensuring national ownership of the priorities identified. The JSC includes six sectoral ministries, the World Bank, the African Union, and Germany, civil society (youth and women) and the CNARR (Commission Nationale pour l'Accueil, la Réinsertion des Réfugiés et le Rapatriement), and it meets twice a year in ordinary session in accordance with Order No 3789/PT/PM/MPEPI/2023. The country team is represented on this committee by the Programme Management Team chair, who is currently the IOM representative. For 2024, the JSC, which met on 4 September to discuss Chad's request for re-eligibility, included other key stakeholders, including the Mediator of the Republic, the Swiss Cooperation, the Ministry of Social Action and the National DDR Commission.

A **Portfolio Evaluation** was finalized in 2024, for the period 2017 to 2023. The evaluation assessed that the PBF portfolio has contributed to a positive and tangible impact on peacebuilding in terms of social cohesion, local governance and strengthening the resilience of vulnerable communities, and in an equally positive but less visible way, in terms of the rule of law and peace at national level. In addition, the PBF was able to flexibly respond to emerging needs and opportunities linked to the transition, for example by supporting the preparations and inclusive holding of the DNIS and the implementation of its recommendations on human rights and transitional justice, as well as the implementation of provisions of the Doha Peace Agreement on the DDR.

In February-March 2024, an **analysis of conflict dynamics** was carried out with a view to identifying and analyzing, in a gender-, age- and climate-sensitive manner, the root causes, immediate causes and manifestations of conflict in Chad and to identify the main dynamics while understanding the implications linked to Chad's geostrategic position. The Chadian system is a dominant party system

with a disorganized opposition and little political space for constructive and inclusive dialogue between members of the political class. The weakness of political dialogue within the political class and between the government and citizens is due in part to a lack of trust, insufficient civic space, non-respect for the civil and political rights of certain sections of the population and the low capacity of civil society organisations to promote civic participation and build a national consensus. In terms of the typology of conflicts in Chad, the analysis highlighted six main types of conflict: (i) agro-pastoral conflicts; (ii) conflict over the management of natural resources; (iii) conflicts linked to the exploitation of mining sites; (iv) local power dynamics; (v) difficult co-existence among communities; and, (vi) inter-generational conflicts. Main structural causes are identified as: (i) governance, (ii) access to justice, (iii) lack of transparency, (iv) corruption, (v) impunity in conflict management.

The authorities have expressed interest in requesting the Secretary-General for a renewal of **eligibility** for the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility of the PBF. The September 2024 JSC approved three strategic priority areas of Chad's new request for eligibility, placing an emphasis on (i) Promoting justice, the fight against corruption and the rule of law, including human rights and the management of conflicts linked to natural resources; (ii) Strengthen social cohesion, local and state mechanisms for conflict prevention and management and promote the socio-economic resilience of the most vulnerable communities; (iii) Support institutional frameworks and local partnerships for the promotion of women and young people under the Women, Peace and Security; Youth, Peace and Security; Climate, Peace and Security agendas.

These peacebuilding priorities are aligned with the **National Strategy for Social Cohesion** which is currently being finalized around these pillars: (i) Strengthening the rule of law to rebuild citizens' confidence in the justice system and other key institutions; (ii) Improving access to essential public services and basic social services through good governance and the promotion of inclusive development; (iii) Reconciling Chadians through inclusive dialogue between different communities with the participation of young people and women; (iv) Promoting conflict prevention and management through peace infrastructures at national and local levels, networked and institutionalised through their effective inclusion in government policies; (v) Ensuring the continuous technical and operational capacity building of key state and non-state actors for the planning, implementation and evaluation of actions.

### **The Peacebuilding Commission and Chad**

On 2 December 2021, the Chair of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (UN PBC), H.E. Mr. Osama Abdelkhalek convened a virtual meeting for the Chadian transitional authorities to present the roadmap for the transition process and brief on the progress and challenges in view of mobilizing international support from partners. The PBC was briefed by the Prime Minister of Chad and the Minister of Economy Development Planning and International Cooperation as well as the AU High Representative and Special Representative for Chad, a UN DPPA Regional Director as representative on behalf of SRSG UNOCA, the World Bank Country Manager for Chad, and the President of the Cellule de Liaison et d'Information des Associations Feminines (CELIAF).

The PBC welcomed progress in the implementation of the Transitional Roadmap, despite serious security, political and humanitarian challenges facing the country and the sub-region. The PBC

strongly encouraged Chad to continue the transition process in a peaceful, inclusive and timely manner, in accordance with the Communiqué adopted by the African Union Peace and Security Council on 14 May. The PBC expressed its commitment, within its mandate, to accompanying Chad in its nationally-led peacebuilding efforts, including inclusive national dialogue, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, constitutional review, and electoral process, and called on partners to increase their efforts to assist Chad in this endeavor.